Unraveling Tactics, Transfers, and Turmoil: The Downfall of Amorim

The lasting impression of Ruben Amorim’s brief 14-month stint at Manchester United might be his dejected figure in the dugout during a disastrous Carabao Cup encounter at Grimsby.

This match, held in August, resulted in a humiliating 12-11 penalty shootout loss, marking the first time in the club’s storied history that they succumbed to a fourth-tier team.

After the match, Amorim’s remarks hinted at a man on the verge of conceding that the role was beyond his capabilities. However, he later backtracked, attributing his emotional outburst to the pressures of the moment, claiming that he often lets his feelings overwhelm him.

Despite facing mounting criticism, Amorim remained steadfast in his approach. A close observer of the team noted that while his media engagements were captivating, they were perhaps his sole area of competence, a brutally honest but arguably unfair critique.

His final game in charge ended in a 1-1 stalemate against Leeds, a result that positioned the team in a respectable sixth place in the Premier League. However, this result was overshadowed by his controversial remarks to journalists just days prior.

In his media session on Friday, he subtly acknowledged divisions within the squad. After the match, he made a defiant statement declaring he would not resign, effectively forcing the club’s hand to either support him or terminate his contract.

With tactical issues persisting and the management already displeased by his harsh treatment of academy talents and remarks directed at senior players, the latter option seemed inevitable.

As the repercussions of his tenure unfold, an in-depth look at Amorim’s time as the head coach reveals the myriad factors that led to his ousting.

A Progressive Appointment Gone Awry

Initially, Amorim’s hiring was hailed as a progressive step for the club, bringing in a modern manager poised for growth within a structured setup.

The 40-year-old introduced a distinctive playing style, characterized by a 3-4-3 formation reminiscent of his time at Sporting. The more he was questioned about this system, the more he clung to it, believing that altering his tactics would undermine his authority and commitment in the eyes of his players.

His confidence in his methods was unshakeable; he once quipped that even the Pope couldn’t persuade him to change. Yet, he acknowledged in October that he had to repeatedly instruct his players to disregard external criticism calling for a change in his tactical approach.

“Is the media going to dictate what I’m going to do? It cannot be. It’s not possible to sustain that,” Amorim stated. “But my players, I guarantee you, they are listening to you and they are putting that inside because we are not winning games.”

This situation came to a head on December 30 when, just days after experimenting with a back four in a narrow victory over Newcastle, he reverted to a three-man defense against Wolves.

This tactical shift meant repositioning Patrick Dorgu from a successful attacking role to left wing-back, leaving fans both shocked and frustrated.

At this stage, United had already attempted to lure long-time target Antoine Semenyo from Bournemouth by promising him a position on the left wing, signaling that the club envisioned a future that diverged from the 3-4-3 model, especially after investing over £200 million in attacking players.

Thus, the decision to employ the old formation against Wolves and the resulting 1-1 draw against a team that had managed only two points all season was met with significant internal disapproval.

Communication Breakdown and Tactical Rigidity

Technical director Jason Wilcox privately urged Amorim to adopt greater tactical flexibility, but the team continued to use the back three against Leeds, further straining his relationship with club leadership.

Amorim expressed a desire to work independently, free from what he perceived as unwelcome interference from Wilcox, while the club viewed this feedback as standard practice, a dynamic that had become increasingly dysfunctional.

Despite holding a sixth-place position, aligning with pre-season forecasts, observers within the club felt that with minor tactical adjustments, the squad could achieve significantly better outcomes.

On Monday morning, Wilcox and chief executive Omar Berrada informed Amorim that he had been dismissed from his role. While results had often been underwhelming, players remained supportive—at least those not exiled in the ‘bomb squad’ at the season’s start.

Amorim’s Unique Approach and the Future

During the club’s summer tour in the United States, there was palpable excitement among players for the upcoming season, despite Amorim’s unconventional methods.

Notably, during training sessions, he often observed from a distance, seemingly disengaged before taking a more hands-on role once practices commenced, although he was reluctant to allow media access.

In contrast, his pre-season training in Chicago was shrouded in secrecy, with limited media involvement, which contrasted sharply with the openness of earlier sessions in Malaysia.

Amorim’s meticulous preparation was evident; during his inaugural training session, he carefully guided midfielder Kobbie Mainoo on his movements following a pass to ensure optimal positioning for subsequent plays.

Despite his thorough approach, the actual match scenarios often took unexpected turns, leading to questionable player selections, such as positioning Mason Mount at left wing-back, which drew sharp criticism after a 3-1 defeat to Brentford.

Insights into the managerial appointment process typically emerge only after significant time has elapsed, but this case is an exception.

Five months after United hired Dan Ashworth as a top-tier sporting director, he departed after his recommendations for Erik ten Hag’s successor were deemed lacking in creativity.

Berrada ultimately persuaded Amorim to join, insisting it was a ‘now or never’ situation when Amorim inquired about postponing his arrival until the season’s end.

At that time, the club’s leadership included Wilcox, Vivell as interim director of recruitment, and Sir Dave Brailsford as a football club director. While the first three remain influential figures in recruitment, Brailsford has shifted his focus to broader responsibilities within Ineos.

Reflecting on a Failed Tenure

As the dust settles from another unsuccessful managerial appointment, the spotlight now shifts to the club’s hierarchy as much as to Amorim.

Club insiders believed Amorim had committed to adapting his tactics during discussions, yet his failure to execute that promise became a source of frustration for management.

Under his leadership, United has experienced declines that seem unfathomable given the current financial landscape of football.

As the world’s fourth richest club, according to Deloitte’s rankings, they have struggled primarily to compete against well-organized smaller teams like Brentford and Brighton, finishing last season trailing West Ham and level on points with Wolves.

Amorim entered the summer with assurances that the current season would yield improvements. While there have been some advancements, the question remains whether a United manager should be evaluated against a mere 15th-place finish.

However, the scrutiny cannot rest solely on the coach. The club was aware of the challenges they were undertaking. The question lingered: does Ratcliffe’s